United Nations Security Council: Reform (Im)Possible

It is beyond dispute that the current configuration of the UN Security Council represents a snapshot, or even a daguerreotype, of an international political and legal vision that has moved away from the one first consolidated at the end of the Cold War, under the banner of the US unipolarity. In the current context, this vision is more fragmented than multipolar, with a scenario of more than two or three poles and their respective spheres of influence. The international community has therefore been confronted with the issue of Security Council reform since the 1990s. This is due to two key factors: firstly, the dissolution of the socialist bloc; and secondly, the emergence of new powers and their alliances. These developments have made the need to redraw the balance of power within the Council, established in Yalta in 1945, even more urgent. Given that the necessity for reform remains unfulfilled, this paper seeks to reconstruct the various scenarios for achieving this enlargement. The only point on which most UN members agree is that the need to change the Council's representation should be met by increasing the number of states that make up the body entrusted with the power to act to maintain international peace and security. The extensive debate on this profile also encompasses the question of whether the new members should be granted the right of veto. In light of the challenges inherent in aligning these two trajectories, the conclusions put forth a de lege lata approach as a provisional measure, contingent upon the eventual realisation of a comprehensive reform of the Security Council.