The Epistemic Bases of Changes of Opinion and Choices: The Joint Effects of the Need for Cognitive Closure, Ascribed Epistemic Authority and Quality of Advice

This research investigates the epistemic underpinnings of changes of opinion and choices. Based on the Lay Epistemic Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2009) and consistent with relevant theories of persuasion (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), we hypothesized that individuals with a high (vs. low) need for cognitive closure would be more influenced by the high (vs. low) level of the epistemic authority of an advisor, and would be less influenced by the quality of the provided advice. These hypotheses were supported in two experimental studies (Total N=352) within two different domains of decision-making (a legal case in Study 1 and consumer behavior in Study 2). The theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.