



**MANTUA HUMANISTIC
STUDIES**

Volume XI

Mantua Humanistic Studies

Volume XI

Edited by
GIOVANNI PASTA



UNIVERSITAS
STUDIORUM

© 2020, Universitas Studiorum S.r.l. - Casa Editrice
via Sottoriva, 9 - 46100 Mantova (MN)
P. IVA 02346110204
www.universitas-studiorum.it

Copertina:
Ilari Anderlini, Art Director
www.graphiceye.it

Foto in copertina:
© Ilari Anderlini

Impaginazione e redazione:
Luigi Diego Di Donna

I contributi pubblicati nella presente miscellanea
sono stati sottoposti a *peer review*

Prima edizione nella collana “Mantua Humanistic Studies” giugno 2020
Finito di stampare nel giugno 2020

ISBN 978-88-3369-088-9

Summary

Design estensivo. Il rapporto tra produzione industriale e personalità del singolo oggetto <i>Andrea Lupacchini</i>	5
Industria 4.0. Sistemi adattivi applicati al design. Personalizzazione tramite l'utilizzo dei nuovi macchinari per l'industria <i>Andrea Lupacchini</i>	23
Who is for, who is against? A sentiment analysis of the new Russian constitution <i>Paola Bocale</i>	39
Cultura multischermo e infanzia: televisione, dispositivi mobili e app <i>Maria Annarumma</i>	55
The Ceramic Corpus from Ghazni: Some Insights into Chronological Issues <i>Agnese Fusaro</i>	73
Parole intraducibili? Uno sguardo al cinese moderno <i>Anna Morbiato</i>	117
La mia esperienza professionale in un dipartimento universitario: un territorio di osservazione dove praticare alcuni valori educativi per attivare processi di autoformazione <i>Giuseppe Liverano</i>	131
<i>Genus e nomen</i> in Cic. <i>Verr.</i> 2,4,1: una rilettura in chiave retorica del binomio <i>πράγμα/ὄνομα</i> di Plat. <i>Theaet.</i> 177e? <i>Irene Giaquinta</i>	179
Una lettera inedita di Augusto Campana per la tradizione di Cic. <i>Scaur.</i> 4 ed <i>Epigr. Bob.</i> 63 <i>Orazio Portuese</i>	191

For Love of the World. Hannah Arendt's political Legacy in an Age of Populism <i>Erica Antonini</i>	211
The theory of war by Enrico Barone <i>Catia Eliana Gentilucci</i>	241
Cellini, Serlio e la copia di un libro di Leonardo <i>Stefano Marconi</i>	271
La vita quotidiana nelle corti del Mezzogiorno tardomedievale <i>Luciana Petracca</i>	285
Représentations sociales des langues en milieu pluri-/multilingue. Une étude menée auprès des Africains subsahariens francophones installés à Naples et à Castel Volturno <i>Daniela Puolato</i>	315
Qu'est-ce qu'on entend pour éclectisme méthodologique ? Et quelle est sa place en DLE ? Identification et histoire d'une problématique « actuelle » <i>Giuseppe Asaro</i>	371
Viaggiatori sentimentali e scientifici nel Distretto dei Laghi: i diari di viaggio di Thomas Gray e William Wordsworth <i>Maria Grazia Dongu</i>	379
La corruzione-virus approfitta dell'emergenza sanitaria da Covid-19? <i>Giovanni Chiola</i>	401
The challenge of intercultural mediation as "educational competence" in plural contexts <i>Giuseppe Milan, Margherita Cestaro</i>	445

The theory of war by Enrico Barone

CATIA ELIANA GENTILUCCI
Università di Camerino

Abstract

Barone proposes a theory of war influenced by marginalist theory and Prussian military thought which is critical of historical determinism and includes the belief that the main reason of social evolution is the search for power.

Keywords: Enrico Barone, war, armed peace, Prussian military thought, social evolution.

Introduction

Enrico Barone (Naples 1859 - Rome 1924)¹ is known to international literature as a marginalist economist, owing to his well-known 1908 piece on the theory of socialist systems²

1. All quotations of Enrico Barone, Irving Fisher, Carl Jean and Maffeo Pantaleoni (in italics) are by the translator, unless stated otherwise. For further details on Enrico Barone, see: Gentilucci 2000a, 2006. See also: Montù 1934; Spinedi 1924; Giacchi 1929; Kuenne 1935; Amoroso 1956; Bousquet 1957; Ratti 1958; Nuccio 1964; Mayer 1968; Lollo 1974; Gallinari 1978; Finoia 1980; Villari 1991; Farese 2012; Mornati 2012; Dardi 2016.

2. Barone 1908. In the 1930s this piece was a key reference in the debate on economic efficiency in the socialist state. Trans. as “The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State” (Hayek 1935). This article became part of the international debate that developed in the 1930s around economic efficiency in the socialist and collectivist systems. In his anthology, Hayek proposed divulging the contribution

“The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State” and for his articles which were printed in the *Giornale degli Economisti* (1893-1896).³

It is equally well-known that Barone was a soldier who dedicated himself to military studies.⁴ So much so, that his output in terms of economic papers is equal to a third of the papers he published on military matters. His work is distinguished by the fact that his military and economic studies were completely independent of each other, owing probably

of non-English authors to planning theory as he himself writes in *Hayek on Hayek* (Kresge and Wenar 1993: 86). Barone’s article was included in the appendix because «it is decidedly more technical than the rest of the book» (Hayek 1935: 40). Oddly enough, Barone’s article was not included in the Italian translation of the 1946 and is not even mentioned in the preface by C. Bresciani-Turroni (Titled: *Pianificazione economica collettivistica. Studi critici sulle possibilità del socialismo*. In von Hayek, A.F., Pierson, N.G., von Mises, L. and Halm, G. eds. Roma: Einaudi).

3. Though he had no university degree, Barone was awarded the chair in political economy at the Regia Università, Rome in 1903. In 1908, he wrote *Principi di economia politica*, expressing an appreciable marginalist eclecticism with room for aspects of economic dynamics. Republished in 1913 and again in 1920-21, the last edition contains a third part dedicated to “La guerra e i fenomeni economici”. In 1910, he is appointed lecturer in Political economy and financial sciences at the *Istituto superiore di studi commerciali*, Rome. He was subsequently nominated lecturer in Colonial economics, Transport economics and Industrial economics. In 1912, he collaborates with Benini on the «Economics and Statistics» entry in *Grande Enciclopedia di Cultura Generale* di Vallardi (Gentilucci 2000a).

4. In his military capacity, he was head of the historical office of the General Staff from 1901 to 1906. In 1906, after a disagreement with Chief of Staff Tancredi Saletta, he resigned his commission. For a review of his activity as a military historian, see Gentilucci 2000b.

to the separation between military and academic institutions which is still very much the case in modern Italy.⁵ Barone (1895: 494) himself affirms that “as other sciences flow towards the Universities, so the military science is concentrated in the Academy of war, which illuminates the army with life-giving light”.

During the period of the Great Wars, it is known that Italian economists dealt with the subject of war principally in relation to its costs and consequences on the economic system (Bientinesi and Patalano 2017, Allio 2014), neglecting to study relations between the army and social progress. Issues which, on the other hand, were amply discussed by Barone; though, unlike his economic studies, these were not welcomed by the academic world. Perhaps his military thinking was too heavily influenced by militarism, or possibly, though his reputation as an excellent economist was never questioned, he was seen as an eccentric character who did not fit inside a box (Dardi 2016, Del Vecchio 1924).

In fact, after meeting Barone, Irving Fisher wrote the following in a letter to his wife dated 20 January 1894: “the eccentric officer who dressed in his uniform, looked more like a Germanic soldier than an economist” (Guiscardo 2008: 49).⁶

5. As we are reminded by Dardi (2016: 389-90), Barone is known as an economist because he was both fortunate and ambitious enough to approach the academic world of his day, though he was first and foremost a military historian who held open-minded views on economic relations while acting outside mainstream academia (Del Vecchio 1925: 301; Guiscardo 2008: 48-50).

6. Irving Fisher: letter to Elle W. Fisher, Florence, 21 January 1894, in *Manuscripts and archives*, Yale University Library, 212, I.2,f 16. Also in Pavanelli 2003: 4-5.

Barone himself was well aware of the double role he held as a scholar, as he was to say himself at a conference in 1916:

the thought of speaking here in my double office as soldier and economist – qualities which have come to me from a penchant for sentiment and intellect and from the vicissitudes of life – brings a smile to my lips. And my work in science too has not been untouched by this; for it has led me to look upon social life as a great, never-ending battle between peoples, alternating fields red with blood among the clamour of arms, and then, no less bitter and implacable, though under a false appearance of calm and peaceful effort in the fields of politics, economics and even science: in all areas in which there is some kind of social activity.

Today, times have changed: the economic and social aspects of conflict as well as the problem posed by the cost of military institutions have become part of economic literature. It seems, also, that the separation between civil and military studies and research has narrowed. For this reason, Barone's observations on military matters, rich in ideas which can be interpreted and applied to modern-day situations, are worthy of being re-examined. We must not forget that, in Italy at least, he continues to be the only example of a neo-classical soldier and economist. This work aims to analyse Enrico Barone's thought in his military capacity with particular regard to his Prussian view of war and peace, while highlighting the most modern, original parts of his thinking. Particular attention will be given to his output as a military scholar.

1. Military studies and the Prussian tradition

His formation as a student of the social sciences developed from his education in military establishments. He was accepted at the *Nunziatella*, Naples in 1874 and his studies

continued in 1878 at the *Accademia Militare* and the *Scuola di Applicazione di Artiglieria e Genio*, Turin and came to a close at the *Scuola di Guerra*, Turin in 1885.

He began his work as a military scholar in 1887 with *Lezioni di Arte militare* (unpublished at the *Scuola di Applicazione di Torino*), eventually producing more than thirty articles and making about 10 appearances as a speaker at conferences, not to mention an intense output as a journalist.⁷

His contribution to military analysis stresses the links between military, economic and sociological aspects of life and is heavily influenced by the Prussian thought of Carl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke and Otto von Bismark (Gentilucci 2017). A system of thought that he was probably exposed to during the voyages he undertook in Germany as a Staff Officer from 1888 to 1892 to lay the foundations of what would become the Treaty of the Triple Alliance which was concluded in 1902 between Germany, Austria and the Kingdom of Italy (Spinedi 1924: 197).

In particular, he considers Clausewitz the true leader of the

7. From 1900 onwards Barone contributed to *La Stampa*, *La Tribuna*, *Il Corriere della Sera*, *Giornale d'Italia*, *Popolo Romano* (of which he was co-director until 1907), *Vita Italiana* as well as *Secolo d'Italia* where he writes under the pseudonym "Spectator" in 1916. He also founded three periodicals: *La Preparazione* (1909-1916), *L'Ufficiale d'Italia* (1920-1921) and *Per la nostra ricostruzione economica* (1923), which had different aims: the first, critical of the Government's political and military choices, was subject to censorship in 1916; the first number of *L'Ufficiale d'Italia* prompted the then Minister of War Ivanoe Bonomi to accuse it of inciting the creation of parallel military institutions (Mondini 2015: 96); while the third was purely economical, dealing with international monetary circulation and exchange rates, and closed after his death on 15 May 1924 (Gentilucci 2017).

school of the science of war, who alone was able to give form to the Prussian system. He cites Clausewitz's *Vom Kriege* (1832-34) on a couple of occasions: in 1895, he defines it as the "inductive book par excellence, the result of an acute observation of fact...: the experimental as opposed to the speculative method" (1895: 494); and again in 1898 when describing Turenne's endeavours in the Alsace⁸ (1898b: 11). He speaks highly of Otto von Bismarck's military skills and the intelligence of his social reforms (Barone 1900a: 442, 1900b: 700).

Finally, Barone dedicates his writings, *Il pensiero di Moltke nell'invasione del 1866 in Boemia* (1900a), *Moltke. A proposito di una recente pubblicazione* (1895) and *Studi sulla condotta della guerra* (1900d) to the Prussian military thinking of Helmuth Karl G.B. von Moltke, praising his qualities as leader and a scholar who was able to link physical conditions, economic and social status, ethnography, customs, traditions, art, literature and all manifestations of human endeavours which could be employed in facing the problems of war, appearing as "resulting from the actions of all social energies" (1895: 501).

Barone also mentions other minor figures in Prussian thinking: in *Lo spirito pubblico della guerra* (1900b) he cites Lorenz von Stein, known for the Prussian social reform movement after the defeat at Jena (1806), and Gerhard von Scharnhorst, a Prussian general noted for his writings on military

8. In his article *I grandi capitani fino alla rivoluzione francese. Turenne* (1898c: 11) he basically rewrites the passage by Clausewitz in Book Seven, Chap. XIX, *Vom Kriege*, which can be found on p. 558 in the English edition (Paret and Brodie 2008).

systems who met Clausewitz. In *Verità vecchie e paradossi nuovi* (1891), he recalls Arnold Eugen Leo Tellenbach for his essay on the rules of shooting *Über die Kunst, im feindlichen Feuer mit möglichst geringen Verlusten zu operiren*.

In the preface to *L'iniziativa dei comandanti in guerra* (1900c) he cites Wilhelm Hermann von Blume, a German general who was the Head of the War Department when Barone visited Germany in 1885. Again, in his *Il pensiero di Moltke. Nell'invasione del 1866 in Boemia* (1900a: 439), he cites General Colmar von der Goltz, a general in the Prussian army whose popularity in German literature owes to his innovative ideas as well as his numerous contributions to war periodicals. Although Prussian social and military culture was promoted following reforms Otto Bismarck initiated after the unification of the German empire in 1871, the original roots of this culture can be found in the *Vom Kriege*, written by Clausewitz in 1832. The Prussian social and military culture appears to be in contrast with the logical, rational ideas supported by Antoine-Henri Jomini at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the German Romantic Idealism of Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Paret 2015: 93).

To better understand Prussian military thought, we must look back to the Treaty of Tilsit (1807), under which Prussia was forced to cut the size of its army and cede many of its territories. After these restrictions were applied, Prussian rulers from Frederick II the Great onwards chose to make their armed forces more effective and better equipped to meet the country's requirements by relying on rigid training. Under this logic, military institutions became closely connected to

the political dimension of the country and military activity became a profession (Barone 1898b: 291). Clark (2006: 215) writes: “Prussia is not a state that possesses an army, but rather an army that possesses a state”.

In short, in my opinion the peculiarities of Prussian thought are the following: a multidisciplinary view of war as both cause and effect of social progress; a view of war as immanent in the history of civilisations; and the concept that military institutions are an instrument of national and international politics (Rusconi 1999: 8-10, 27-30; Gat 1992: 13-14).

All these matters were amply dealt with by Barone, leading him to consider military concerns as being a central part of collective life in times of peace as well as war, and military spending (in its capacity to bring about order and safety) as producing wealth.

2. The theory of war

Neoclassical economists of the Italian Novecento movement focused mainly on problems posed by the need to finance conflicts already underway (Ruini 1940) and held to the central idea that war events were external to ordinary economic issues (Allio 2014: 113).

At the start of the twentieth century, economists seemed to pick up on the first marginalist considerations on the economy of war as formulated by Arthur C. Pigou⁹ (1916, 1921), who considered the economics of war as distinct from the economics of peace. Conflict is, in fact, seen as consisting of events not ordinarily part of the automatic mechanisms intrinsic to the in-

9. That Barone, however, seems to have consulted. As specified in his letter to G. Prato (1917).

visible hand, containing as they do irrational elements such as fear and uncertainty (Ruini 1940). Barone, on the other hand, conceived the economic system as a single being which should therefore be studied in the same way, in times of peace and war. In our opinion, therefore, Barone's theory of war is more far-reaching, as his economic theory encompasses Prussian military thought.

One must first of all stress that though Barone was linked to early-twentieth century Marginalism, he is an unorthodox economist who places Walrasian thinking (with its focus on achieving economic efficiency) on the same level as a more classical, humanistic vision of economics.¹⁰ This approach allowed him to analyse the economics of war without renouncing his convictions as a scholar of Prussian military thought. The result is a cohesive system of thought in which war is seen on the one hand as fundamental to the evolution of civilisations and, on the other as being at the root of economic cycles. Prussian and economic theory go side by side to explain the causes and consequences of war. Barone himself maintains that the economic and social consequences of war cannot be explained by using only the principles of marginalist individualism. Thus, in his *Principi di Economia Politica* (1936 [1920]: 709-710), he says:

10. Barone can be considered a heterodox neoclassical economist, as he does not believe that equilibrium in the market is achieved naturally. His studies of political economy show the economic system moves towards a dynamic equilibrium it will never be able to achieve as it is always being influenced by external factors. Furthermore on a number of occasions he is critical of the excessive use of mathematical theorems which, in his opinion, simplify economic reasoning, rendering it arid by removing theory from reality. For more complete details, please see Gentilucci 2006 and Dardi 2016.

War has not given rise to a ‘new science’; it has, surely, given non-partisan scholars, who do not care to follow traditional formulas, an enormous quantity of facts – generally new, more for their size than their nature – which allow them to reconsider doctrines and make improvements to them where needed, to ensure that our science may continue to be what it should: a synthesis of facts explained in a logical manner, coordinated in its most general appearance.

In his letter to Giuseppe Prato, Barone wrote that in his studies [on wartime economy] he was endeavouring to treat all the manifestations of war as if they were a dynamic disturbance in the economic equilibrium, a fact that agreed perfectly with what was taught by their science (reminding him that this was far from going bankrupt, an opinion held by those who were ignorant). Furthermore, he wished to establish once and for all that State intervention is never harmful when it proposes to and is capable of reaching a condition of economic equilibrium. He is of the opinion that without State intervention, this (equilibrium) would eventually be reached, but probably too late, and concludes that it should be guided not by Empiricism but by a sound knowledge of economic laws.

The closeness of the Walrasian and Clausewitzian systems is not surprising, especially when considered in the light of this declaration by Aron (2003: 23):

Clausewitz is a theoretician of absolute war, not a doctrinaire of total war or militarism, just as Walras is a theoretician of equilibrium, not a doctrinaire of liberalism. Conceptual analysis, concerned with isolating the essence of the human act, has been mistakenly confused with the determination of an objective.

For Barone (à la Clausewitz), conflict is a natural progression of politics, as it breaks out when dialogue between nations fails. Armed conflict is an extreme method chosen by states

to claim their rights on an international stage. Thus, being a political act, war is part of social dynamics. As such, it is immanent in the history of society and develops civilisations (Barone 1887: IV-VI).

The aim of every country is “for the individuals who are part of it to attain moral, intellectual and economic progress”. Reaching this objective creates attrition between powers that is not always possible to resolve peacefully. Thus, it becomes necessary to “resort to the extreme measure of force in order to ensure the triumph of will: war”. This is an inevitable social phenomenon which accompanies the existence of states, and in fact, Barone (1898a: VIII) writes that “war transcends man, being inherent in the social and political conduct of every society”. And again,

war is not the folly of a king or of a people, but the imposing law of humanity. It answers the requirements of each and every society in the history of mankind: the eternal exploitation of the weak by the strong (1898b: 111).

Moreover, war is a complex problem, “so varied, so intricate in its mix of material and moral fact” (Barone 1895: 501) that it cannot be explained on economic grounds alone, as it includes “collective feelings” guided by shared social values and is capable of “sweeping not just one man away but entire classes and societies” (Barone 1898a: XVI).

Even the current literature considers emotional aspects to be an important part of the dynamics of war; so, for example, Harrison (2015: 2) writes:

What is conflict? There is a potential for conflict whenever two persons disagree, for example, about how to use or dispose of a resource. Resources can be of any kind – physical, financial, political, or emotional.

The most important manifestation of collective feelings is seen in “social discipline”. In this respect, Barone (1912: 20) notes that in order to explain economic progress, economists refer to the workforce, to the land, to savings and production, all the while neglecting to consider social discipline: a connecting factor of values and social objectives that lead to victory and the social and productive order of a collective. He writes that it is: “the most excellent of virtues and marvellous explosion of jewels on the trunk of civil life!”; and again, in praise of the Prussian system:

we have seen the example of countries that, like the Prussian Jena, rose from a disgraceful war. [...] military forces on cruel fields are the supreme expression and stupendous synthesis of the civil virtues of a people. Patriotism and social discipline are two names and yet the same thing (1911: 25).

In Barone’s opinion, social discipline was a “bundle of connecting virtues” responsible for achieving victory on the field of battle, in economic competition and in the investigation of human thought: “strength, science and wealth are three branches growing from the same trunk, having the same nourishment as social discipline” (Barone 1911: 26).

In his complex vision of the world, Walrasian efficiency was linked to Prussian thought by social discipline. This, in fact, was born of a rigid education like the one given to Prussian soldiers and which comes close to the rational behaviour of *homo economicus*. Barone is of the opinion that Prussian military discipline develops the “connective virtues” which make of man a rational, efficient machine in his choices, both in battle and in the economic field. Stressing this similarity, he affirms that “strength” [victory in a military sense], “science” and “wealth” [economic success] are branches that grow from

the same trunk [progress], and feed off the same life blood [connective virtues]" (Barone 1920: 20).

Germany, in Barone's view, was an efficient economic system, so much so that it was *the new word* (Barone 1889: 10). In a piece of writing, dated 1902, Barone saw Germany's economic wealth as a consequence of the Germans' ability to be "humble slaves of duty" as they industriously and accurately carried out their work within industry, administration and finance. Characteristics that:

in the field of war, generate strength and cruel victory; in the field of thinking, discovery and scientific success; in the field of commerce and industry, the minimum production cost and economic triumph (Barone 1902: 41).

He writes (1900b: 700):

the great German nation has not become strong and powerful because her armies were victorious in battle [he is referring to the Franco-Prussian war of 1871]. The truth is, rather, this: modern Germany is a product of a network of civic virtues, of which war is but a manifestation, the remainder of which we see as strong in times of peace.

For this reason, social discipline, able to give integrity to human behaviour, allows people to reach clear, rational goals and Barone observes this was certainly the case in German economic growth. It also implies having an illumined Head of State. As in a collectivist system, in war too Barone says the economic system must be placed under state control, seeing as conflict brings about violent and deep changes to distribution while destroying savings (1920: 650).

In particular, a country at war must become *a society marching in front of a collectivist regime*, the state having a say in production, the use of capital, distribution of wealth and the

jobs market, but in the manner of an *intelligent dictator* must not *shatter* the springs that stimulate consumer choice (Barone 1920a: 682).

Leaving economic agents free to choose allocations does not discourage the market speculation that is responsible for directing economic processes. That is to say the state must intervene when it comes to deciding what goods to offer, while consumer choices should be left unhampered in order to satisfy consumer needs (which are also modified by the war) and reach satisfying levels of collective affluence.

This conceptual model, Walrasian in nature, is connected to what is described in *The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State*, in which Barone hypothesizes that equilibrium in the collectivist state can only be reached when consumption choices are unconstrained (Dooley 1998, Petretto 1982). The validity of this reasoning has been confirmed recently by Harrison (2015: 3) who, while not citing Barone directly, when analysing a war situation affirms that:

When I coerce you, I impose my choice on yours. As the OED (Oxford English Dictionary) puts it, it is “the application of force to control the action of a voluntary agent. But the agent is still voluntary, and coercion does not deprive the agent of all choice. Rather, coercion means I force you to choose between the alternatives as I have defined them, not as you would see them”. In this way then, coercion would be productive of a social benefit.

Another aspect, of a Prussian type, seems to place Barone’s theory on the economy of war close to the hypothetical model he describes in his *Ministry of Production*. In both

cases (as liberal head of state in a time of conflict and collectivist minister in peaceful times), those who are responsible for planning the economic system must be “illuminated and rational”.

On this subject, Bradley and Mosca (2014) also affirm that

So if in conditions of peace the only practical choice is the decentralised market, in times of war centralized planning and allocation are required. For Barone, in these conditions the only practical choice is centralized economic control. We note in passing that in this context the Ministry of Production takes on the features that recall the rational leaders of his military writings.


In fact, *L'iniziativa dei comandanti in guerra*, written in 1900, emphasises the value of H. von Blume and, on another occasion, exalts the entrepreneurial spirit of general H. von Moltke, both commanders who supported Bismarck during the reconstruction of Germany.

3. Armed peace

Barone places the image of unavoidable war side by side with the idea of an “armed peace”. Conflict is, for him, so much a part of the political life of a nation, that even periods of peace are only apparent, being as they are a consequence of the force of arms (deterrence) and political mediation.

It is interesting to observe that the same concept emerges in contemporary literature. Lund (1996: 38), for example, illustrates the theory of the Conflict Cycle according to which the succession of conflict and truces is a consequence of the political and diplomatic efforts between countries.

Figure 1. Curve of conflict



Source: <https://extranet.creativeworldwide.com>

Foucault (2007: 25) also maintains that in times of peace, political conflicts, disputes for and against power and changes in power relations should be interpreted as a continuation of war. They should, that is to say, be deciphered as episodes, fragments, movements which are part of war itself. And in this way, even when writing about the history of peace and its institutions, we would always be writing about the history of war.

For this reason, the Baronian analysis of military matters appears more modern and far-reaching than that of early twentieth century economists, whose main interests were the study of peace and the analysis of military costs.

Therefore, Barone upsets the theoretical approach to war: peace is not innate in the history of civilisation, but merely a momentary truce achieved thanks to the use of arms. He observes that (Barone 1895: 503):

Armed peace is a great ill, but a lesser ill than war. The ultimate goal, norm, civil aspiration is gradual disarmament. Which is nonetheless a utopian ideal, as the law of humanity is conquest and oppression.

Thus, maintaining the use of arms is the only way of establishing a balance between powers that can guarantee international peace and internal order. He notes that “a government can be as liberal as it wishes, but has a duty to maintain order”, investing in the upkeep of the armed forces in the light of threats to peace. Either from outside forces or within (Barone 1903: 448) and international relations a country intends to keep with other countries (Barone 1892: 60-63).

The influence of Clausewitz can be felt in this idea, too. In fact, the Prussian theorist is of the firm opinion that peace can only be kept by setting up a balance between forces that is so effective that enemies do not see anything to be gained by modifying its terms.

In modern terms, the same idea is expressed by Coulomb and Dunne (2008: 13) when they say:

Generally speaking, one would have to define peace as the absence of war and schools of thought would perceive this in different ways. Mercantilists would certainly see conflict as inevitable and peace as the gap between wars, while realists would choose a Clausewitzian perspective on war as an extension of politics. [...]. In terms of effectiveness in the prosecution of peace this would clearly require the development of peacekeeping and peace-making forces and related equipment.

Regarding military spending necessary for maintaining peace, Barone makes a fundamental logical step which was not taken by the marginalist literature of the early twentieth century: as order and defence are fundamental for economic growth, they are included in the category of public goods.

In his magazine *La Preparazione* (1909), Barone writes that in order to prove that military spending produces growth, one would need a treaty of political economics as well as another one on world history:

armies, as instruments of war, are the first producers of the world. Their strength creates daily products both for the simple act of existing (keeping the peace) and extraordinary products such as appropriation in case of need. It is not an exaggeration to affirm that the military forces indirectly concur in all forms of production, because order, tranquillity, and the ability to enjoy the fruits of one's labour are conditions which are indispensable to all (1909).

In *Principi di economia finanziaria* (Barone 1920b: 8-9, 71), he maintains that every good that satisfies a need produces utility, as in the case of military spending which satisfies the need for defence and security. Order and security are, therefore, public goods as they concur to improve collective affluence.

The same line of reasoning can be found in Carlo Jean (2004: 37) when he says that security is a public good whose nature is similar to that of an insurance policy against the risk/likelihood of an aggression or internal loss of stability:

A state feels secure when it is not being threatened; or when it has a reasonable hope of facing these threats successfully, at an acceptable risk and expense. Threats concern its interests, which are not only material in nature, but include values, self-image, the prestige of its ruling elite and its international prestige as well as its cultural identity.

Anderton and Carter (2009: 51) also observe that:

Distinctions between private and public goods are important in many areas of conflict economics. A nation's deterrence of external enemies is often modeled as a public good: deterrence is nonrival because one person's security does not preclude other persons from

enjoying the same security, and it is nonexcludable because individuals can enjoy the security regardless of whether they help cover the cost. In an alliance, two or more nations may find it in their interest to share the burden of defense when military goods used for deterrence purposes are non rival. Peacekeeping operations can also have public goods characteristics.

Furthermore, Brauer and Van Tuyll (2008: 288) state that:

Defense is usually economists' prime textbook example of a public good – a good that, once produced for one, can yield benefits to additional users without additional cost and from whose value flow these additional beneficiaries cannot feasibly be excluded.

Another interesting aspect of Barone's careful investigation is the fact that there is no necessary connection between peace and social well-being, war and economic crisis. So much so, that he foresees the possibility of a "peace crisis" and "short-lived economic prosperity" in times of conflict.

A prosperity which gives rise to a situation similar to the one that is observed during the expansion stage of the economic cycle (1920: 653). On this subject, he determines a mechanism which multiplies the national income and explains it using an *ante litteram* Keynesian example:

Let us imagine that a certain insular country should decide to dig into its savings and start executing a succession of absurd works [...] with the objective of drying out the sea. This phenomenon [...] shall be accompanied by a series of signs that could give the illusion of growing wealth: businesses showing high profits, an increase in salaries, consumption and so on and so forth (1920a: 669-670).

In the same way, continues Barone, intensifying production in military industries raises demand and prices. Whoever is involved in these processes, entrepreneurs or workers alike,

will increase consumption as profit grows: the ‘new rich’ spend and the workers consume more (1920a: 671).

He does not, however, go into the implications state intervention in the war industry has on national wealth, as he seems more interested in studying the long-term effects of war events.

Our economist is also of the opinion that at the end of the war, a country will find itself lacking in resources thus entering a phase he calls a “peace crisis” which is basically caused by the reduction in savings capital available for production. The solution Barone proposes is to increase labour productivity without applying a tax on the profits incurred by war (Barone 1914), as the latter might result from efficient entrepreneurship.

In agreement with the Prussian theory that armies made strong by social discipline bring soldiers and the general public closer together, Barone supports the idea that peace causes the social fabric to weaken:

In the «fertile» period of peace, the triumph of the individual is often ensured by egoism, the lack of scruples, by simulation and similar so-called qualities. High virtues which guarantee the constant, long-lasting rise of human society, are often cause of individual weakness and not strength, when we are dealing with aggressive daily ambition. (Barone 1912: 24).

We can see Moltke’s influence in this passage, considering that he thought that, without war, the world would become putrid and would lose itself in materialism (Bouthoul 1982: 99).

Taking his discourse to the extreme, he also maintains that capitalist dynamics in a situation of “non-armed” peace (1912: 16) could bring about financial losses worse than the

ones which might be experienced by a system that is threatened by war. This in view of the fact that capitalist competition between states would become a desperate economic fight. Furthermore, in his opinion, the strength of arms had a role in mitigating economic ambitions between states.

To sum up, war is so much a part of the social system that economic life goes through cycles of “armed peace” (thanks to a country’s diplomatic efforts and the dissuasive influence of its military policy), armed conflict and their effects on economic processes and by peace crises; finally returning to armed peace.

4. Enrico Barone, Maffeo Pantaleoni and Vilfredo Pareto

Barone’s main interlocutors on the subject of war were Vilfredo Pareto and Maffeo Pantaleoni, who urged our economist to look at military history though their views on the relationship between conflict and economic growth were very different.

On recommendation by Pantaleoni, Barone wrote *La storia militare della nostra guerra fino a Caporetto* (1919) the preface of which, edited by Pantaleoni himself (1919: 150), reads:

We are particularly pleased to see that Enrico Barone has accepted our invitation, as we know of very few thinkers able as he is of separating the wheat from the chaff, being intelligible, powerful and possessing an almost encyclopaedic culture.

Pantaleoni (1917: 15) says that war creates new requirements which must be met, according to the law of the equality of marginal utilities. The cost of conflict is given by the opportunity costs of goods and services which can no longer be produced using national resources destined to satisfy the

requirements of war and the cost mobilising its economy for war production (Pantaleoni 1916: 168, Barucci 2016). When it comes to national wealth, war represents a clear loss because of the increase in prices and consequent changes to salaries, assets and the availability of goods themselves (1916: 210).

The distance between the two authors is evident: Pantaleoni believes war and economics to be “two distinct areas” (1915: 132), acts of war extraneous to normal economic processes in times of peace, but entail changes in the management of normal economic relations in a community.

Both authors agree, however, that the organisation of a military system does not only serve to deter potential enemies, but also means that the passage to a war economy will cost less due to investments to prepare for the likelihood of war. Another economist who has contacts with Barone is Vilfredo Pareto who, like Pantaleoni, sees war as extraneous to normal economic dynamics. As Coulomb reminds us (2004: 70):

Like all neoclassical economists, he does not include the study of defence in his system of theoretical analysis. Nevertheless, he wrote numerous texts on this ‘economic policy’ issue. According to Pareto, theoretical research in economy was only a part of social science. Indeed, he published a *Treaty of Sociology* in 1916.

In a sociological sense, Pareto and Barone seem to share the idea that wars are caused by irrational reasons such as differences in religion and political institutions, or close-minded individuals in government who seek to maintain their power lobbies (Pareto 1920: 694, 749).

For Pareto, however, the military is a useless institution whose cost has a negative effects on national wealth and econom-

ic dynamics (Allio 2014: 59). Thus, in his *Corso di Economia Politica* (1896: 73), Pareto admits that though a basic function of the State is to guarantee external peace, military spending is not necessarily the best option for achieving this state, as it asks for enormous sacrifices to be made by all.

Unlike Barone, Pareto does not see military spending (in times of peace) as an investment contributing to national wealth. Though he notes that when a State spends on defence, it should do so according to a policy that is in line with the economic situation the country is going through (Pareto 1913).

On the other hand, he agrees with Barone when he says that military spending should decrease during depressive phases during which support for the military is low. On the contrary, an expansive phase marked by an increase in savings and positive projections on consumer spending will allow for a stronger military policy.

There remains, however, a substantial divide between them on the intrinsic worth of war: while Pareto is critical of militarism in general, even in times of economic expansion, Barone is basically in favour of spending, in its means to encourage the creation of public goods, order and security, essential prerequisites of economic growth.

A significant difference emerges between Barone when compared to Pantaleoni and Pareto: the latter viewing war as an anomaly which destroys wealth; while Barone, as stated above, saw war and military spending as an occasion for progress.

5. Conclusions

Unlike the reaction to Barone's well-known 1908 piece *The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State*, little has been

written on his intellectual output, though his contribution in an economic, sociological, military, historical and philological sense is certainly worthy of consideration. His views were so open-minded and multifaceted that he was able to give original pointers dealing with the complexity of military, economic and social events in their dynamicity and inter-connectedness.

In explaining his theory of war, Barone refers to two main concepts: the Walrasian and the Prussian. These ideas share the belief that human behaviour is inherently rational. Following the Prussian approach, he exalts the relations between war and economics, seeing social discipline as the approach which ensures victory in war and economic competition. Following the Walrasian approach, on the other hand, he stresses the need to nationalise the economic system as would be done in a collectivist system.

It must also be remembered that Barone – unlike other early twentieth century economists – conceives war as a natural event, dormant in international relations, influencing economic and social relations. In his view of the history of civilisation, progress happens in phases which are not governed by neutral economic processes, but strength: “the eternal exploitation of the weak by the strong” (Barone 1898a: VIII).

References

- Allio, R. 2014. *Gli economisti e la guerra*. Catanzaro: Rubbettino.
- Amoroso, L. 1956. “Barone Enrico.” In *Enciclopedia delle scienze politiche ed economiche*. Bologna: Zuffi.

- Anderton, C.H. and Carter, J.R. 2009. *Principles of Conflict Economics. A Primer for Social Scientists*. Cambridge: University Press.
- Aron, R. 2013. *Peace and War. A theory of international Relation*. New Jersey Krieger: Publishing Company.
- Barone, E. 1887. *Lezioni di Arte Militare*. Torino: Scuola di Guerra.
- Barone, E. 1889. "Del combattimento autonomo: a proposito del nuovo regolamento per la Fanteria tedesca." *Rivista Militare Italiana* 3/34: 5-38.
- Barone, E. 1891. "Verità vecchie e paradossi nuovi." *Rivista di Artiglieria e Genio* 2: 87-131.
- Barone, E. 1892. *Come operano i grandi eserciti*. Roma: Casa Editrice Italiana.
- Barone, E. 1895. "Moltke. A proposito di una recente pubblicazione." *Nuova Antologia* ottobre: 490-510.
- Barone, E. 1898a. *Le istituzioni militari e le condizioni politico sociali*. Torino: Roux Frascati.
- Barone, E. 1898b. *I grandi capitani fino alla rivoluzione francese*. Torino: Roux Frascati.
- Barone, E. 1900a. "Il pensiero di Moltke nell'invasione del 1866 in Boemia." *Rivista Militare Italiana* 1: 439-468.
- Barone, E. 1900b. "Lo spirito pubblico nella guerra." *Nuova Antologia* 3: 694-710.
- Barone, E. 1900c. "Prefazione." In Faitini, V. ed. *Gen. Von Blume. L'iniziativa dei comandanti in guerra*. Torino: F. Casanova Editore.
- Barone, E. 1900d. *Studi sulla condotta della guerra*. Torino: Roux Viarengo.
- Barone, E. 1902. "Il mare nella vita economica." *Riforma sociale* 12: 31-49.
- Barone, E. 1903. "Armi e politica." *Nuova Antologia* 3: 444-453.
- Barone, E. 1908. "The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State." *Giornale degli Economisti* Sept./Oct. 2: 267-93, 392-414.

- Barone, E. 1909. "Spese necessarie ma improduttive?" *La Preparazione* 57.
- Barone, E. 1911. *Adua. Nel quindicesimo anniversario*. Roma: Tipografia Roma.
- Barone, E. 1912. *La guerra nell'ascensione economica*. Roma: Armani & Stein.
- Barone, E. 1914. "Riforme tributarie?" *La Preparazione* 3.
- Barone, E. 1916. *Conferenza. Il prestito della vittoria*. Roma: Fondo Direttorio Stringher della Banca d'Italia.
- Barone, E. 1919. *La storia militare della nostra guerra fino a Caporetto*. Bari: Laterza.
- Barone, E. 1920. *La guerra nell'ascensione economica*. Roma: Armani&Stain.
- Barone, E. 1937 [1920]. *Le opere economiche. Principi di economia finanziaria*. Piperno, A. ed. Bologna: Zanichelli.
- Barucci, P. 2016. "Pigou, Pantaleoni e la teoria economica della guerra." *Pensiero Economico Italiano* 24/1: 15-26.
- Bientinesi, F. and Patalano, R. 2017. *Economists and War. A Heterodox Perspective*. New York-London: Routledge.
- Bousquet, G. 1957. "Barone Enrico." In *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*. New York: Macmillan.
- Bouthoul, G. 1982. *Le guerre. Elementi di polemologia*. Milano: Longanesi.
- Bradley, M.E. and Mosca, E. 2014. "Enrico Barone's Ministry of Production: content and Context." *The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 21/4: 664-698.
- Brauer, J. and Van Tuyl, H. 2008. *Castles, Battles e Bombs. How economics explains military history*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Clark, C. 2006. *Iron Kingdom. The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947*. London: Penguin

- Clausewitz, von C. 2008 [1832]. *On War*. Paret, P. and Brodie, B. eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Coulomb, F. 2004. *Economic Theories of Peace and War*. London: Routledge.
- Dardi, M. 2016. "Enrico Barone." In Faccarello, G. and Kurz, H.D. eds. *Handbook on the History of Economic Analysis*. Glos-Uk: Eldgar Publishing. 388-390
- Del Vecchio, G. 1925. "L'opera scientifica di Enrico Barone." *Giornale degli Economisti* XL/LXV: 573-578.
- Dooley, P.C. 1998. "Enrico Barone." In Meacci, F. ed. *Italian Economists on the 20th Century*. Cheltenham U.K.: Edward Elgar.
- Dunne, P. and Coulomb, F. 2008. "Peace, War and International Security: Economic Theories." In Fontanel, J. and Manas, C. eds. *War, Peace and Security*. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Farese, G. 2012. *Barone visto da Giovanni Farese*. Roma: LUISS University Press.
- Finoia, M. 1980. *Il pensiero economico italiano 1850/1950*. Bologna: Cappelli.
- Foucault, M. 2007. *Il faut défendre la Société. Cours au Collège de France (1975-1976)*. Paris: Hautes Études.
- Gallinari, V. 1978. "Enrico Barone." *Rivista Militare* 1: 75.
- Gat, A. 1992. *The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Gentilucci, C.E. 2000a. "Profilo biografico inedito di Enrico Barone." *Nuova Economia e Storia* 3: 69-104.
- Gentilucci, C.E. 2000b. "Economia, sociologia e arte militare. Un excursus tra gli scritti politico-sociali di Enrico Barone." *Il pensiero economico moderno* 1: 41-67.
- Gentilucci, C.E. 2006. *L'agitarsi del mondo in cui viviamo. L'economia politica di Enrico Barone*. Torino: Giappichelli.

- Gentilucci, C.E. 2017. *Difesa, sicurezza ed economia. Enrico Barone e la guerra tra razionalità e sentimento*. Napoli: ESI.
- Giacchi, N. 1929. "Enrico Barone." In *Bollettino dell'Ufficio Storico*. Roma: Ufficio Storico SME.
- Guiscardo, R. 2008. "Enrico Barone. Economista e scrittore militare. Storia economica della Guerra." In Gentilucci, C.E. ed. *Storia economica della guerra*. Roma: Litos. 47-76.
- Harrison, M. 2015. *The economics of coercion and conflict*. London: World Scientific Publishing.
- Hayek, F.A. 1935. *Collectivist Economic Planning*. Reprinted in Marchionatti, R. 2004. *Early Mathematical Economics 1871-1915: The Establishment of the Mathematical Method in Economics*. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis. 227-263.
- Jean, C. 2004. *Manuale di studi strategici*. Milano: Franco Angeli.
- Kresge, S. and Wenar, L. 1993. *Hayek on Hayek*. Chicago: Routledge.
- Kuenne, R. 1935. "Barone Enrico." In *International encyclopedia of social sciences*. New York: Gale.
- Lollo, L. 1974. "Enrico Barone: profilo della sua vita militare." *L'Amministrazione della difesa* July-October.
- Lund, M.S. 1966. *Preventing violent conflicts. A strategy for preventive diplomacy*. Washington: Institute of Peace Press.
- Mayer, G. 1968. "Enrico Barone." *Quadrante* 1 January.
- Mondini, M. 2015. *La politica delle armi il ruolo dell'esercito nell'avvento del fascismo*. Bari: Laterza.
- Montù, C. ed. 1934. "Enrico Barone." In *Storia dell'Artiglieria italiana*. Vol. III. Roma: Rivista d'artiglieria e Genio.
- Mornati, F. 2012. "Barone, Enrico." In *Il Contributo italiano alla storia del Pensiero*. Enciclopedia Treccani.
- Nuccio, O. 1964. "Barone Enrico." *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*. Roma: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia italiana.

- Pantaleoni, M. 1915. "La guerra non costa denaro, ma determinati beni economici." In *Note in margine della guerra*. Bari: Laterza&Figli. 130-138.
- Pantaleoni, M. 1916. "Fenomeni economici della guerra." *Giornale degli economisti* marzo: 157-211.
- Pantaleoni, M. 1917. "Gli insegnamenti economici della Guerra." In *Tra le incognite*. Bari: Laterza&Figli.
- Pantaleoni, M. 1919. *La fine provvisoria di un'epopea*. Bari: Laterza&Figli.
- Paret, P. 2015. "Machiavelli, Fichte, and Clausewitz in the Labyrinth of German Idealism." *Ethics & Politics* 3: 78-95.
- Paret, P. and Brodie, B. 2008. *On War*. Princeton: University Press.
- Pareto, V. 1920 [1913]. *Alcune relazioni tra lo stato sociale e le variazioni della prosperità economica*. In *Fatti e Teorie*. Firenze: Vallecchi.
- Pareto, V. 1953 [1896]. *Corso di economia politica*. Vol. II. Torino: ESI.
- Pareto, V. 1966 [1920]. "Dopo quattro anni di guerra." In Busino, G. ed. *Scritti Sociologici*. Torino: UTET.
- Pavanelli, G. 2003. "Aspetti della teoria neoclassica in Italia tra Otto e Novecento: la ricezione del contributo di Fisher." In Barucci, P. ed. *Le frontiere dell'economia politica*. Firenze: Poli-Stampa. 371-404.
- Petretto, A. 1982. "Enrico Barone e i fondamenti della moderna teoria dell'allocazione delle risorse." *Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali* 1/2: 147-167.
- Pigou, A.C. 1916. *The Economy and Finance of the War*. London: J.M. Dent & Sons Limited.
- Pigou, A.C. 1921. *The Political Economy of War*. London: MacMillan.
- Ratti, A.M. 1958. "Un grande economista. Enrico Barone." *Il globo* 8 novembre.
- Ruini, C. 1940. *Economia di guerra. Linee teoriche*. Bari: Laterza.
- Rusconi, G.E. 1999. *Clausewitz, il Prussiano. La politica della guerra nell'equilibrio europeo*. Torino: Einaudi.

Spinedi, F. 1924. "Di un metodo nello studio della scienza economica." *Rivista internazionale di scienze sociali e discipline ausiliari* luglio 193-206, agosto: 273-284.

Villari, R. 1991. "Nota biografica." In *Enrico Barone. Moneta e risparmio*. Torino: Utet.